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The distinctive feature of the sentence of life imprisonment is that it is indeterminate. 
Unlike a prisoner serving a fixed term the life sentence prisoner does not know when, 
if ever, he or she will be released. Moreover, where the sanction is mandatory, life 
imprisonment is an inflexible instrument that does not take account of the culpability 
of the particular offender and such sentences are difficult to reconcile with the princi-
ple of proportionality. I It is not surprising that the compatibility of life sentences with 
human rights principles has become a matter of concern, as have the arrangements put 
in place to facilitate the release of life sentence prisoners. 2 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a series of rulings in 
which life sentences have been evaluated in the light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The Court has not declared that the life sentence per se 
involves a breach of the ECHR but it has pronounced on the review mechanisms and 
procedures that are required by the Convention. In short, once the punitive element of 
a life sentence has been served the prisoner is entitled to frequent and speedy review of 
the lawfulness of his or her imprisonment by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
The stated purpose underlying this regime is to protect the prisoner against the arbi-
trary prolonging of his or her incarceration. 
The current Irish position is that the question of release is exclusively an executive 
matter and the courts have demonstrated a marked reluctance to interfere with the 
exercise of that power. The power of release has been assigned by statute to the 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The Parole Board, a non-statutory 
body, advises the Minister but crucially he or she is not bound by that advice. In a 
series of decisions the superior courts in Ireland have invoked separation of powers 
Considerations to reinforce this stance and they have demonstrated a marked reluc-
tance to interfere with the exercise of that executive power. 
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This article considers current Irish law on the review of life sentences, as opposed to 
fixed-term sentences, in the light of the ECtHR jurisprudence. The principal conclu-
sion is that Irish law is incompatible with the ECHR. The question of how Irish law 
might be brought into compliance with the Convention is briefly considered. 
ECHR AND LIFE SENTENCES 
Since the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the 
Convention enjoys an enhanced proftle in Irish domestic law. 3 The jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights has a greater purchase in domestic proceedings: 
Irish courts are now required to take judicial notice of declarations, decisions, advi-
sory opinions and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and to take 
'due account' of the principles established by those instruments.4 The courts are 
enjoined, where possible, to interpret national law in a manner that is compatible with 
the ECHR5 and the superior courts are authorised to issue a declaration of incompat-
ibility where a national law falls foul of the ECHR.6 
A declaration of incompatibility does not invalidate a national legal measure, but 
of course it would place direct pressure on the Oireachtas (Parliament) to remedy the 
position in order to ensure alignment between Irish law and ECHR demands. This 
position may be contrasted with that which pertains under the Constitution where the 
superior courts may declare legislation to be invalid . 7 A measure that is so condemned 
by the superior courts is considered null and void. In the result, there are in effect two 
bodies of rights which operate in Irish law, namely national constitutional rights and 
the ECHR via the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. Although there 
might be significant overlaps between these two bodies the distinction between them 
must be borne in mind. 8 
The European Court has been presented with a growing number of cases concern-
ing the determination of life sentences in recent years. This has provided the Court 
with the opportunity to spell out in some detail the requirements of the ECHR on the 
matter. Accordingly it is incumbent on signatory states to align their procedures gov-
erning the conditional release on licence of life sentence prisoners with rulings of the 
Strasbourg Court. 
3 See remarks of Keams J in Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005]1 IR 604 at 608: 'The 2003 Act ... does 
not purport to incorporate the Convention directly into domestic law, but rather imposes an obligation 
that, when interpreting or applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, insofar as is possi-
ble, and subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a manner com-
patible with the State's obligations under the Convention provisions. The 2003 Act also provides that every 
organ of the State shall, subject to any statutory provision or rule oflaw, perform its functions in a manner 
compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention provisions. A party may also seek from the 
High or Supreme Court a declaration that a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the 
State's obligations under the Convention provisions, and where such a declaration is made certain conse-
quences as detailed in the Act then follow'. 
4 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 4. 
5 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 2. 
6 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 5. 
7 Constitution ofIreiand, Art. 15.4.2. 
8 See further: G Hogan, The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003' (2006) 12(3) European 
Public Law 331; G Anthony, 'Clustered Convergence? European Fundamental Rights Standards in Irish 
and UK Public Law' [2004] Public La\V 283. 
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In general, European human rights law accepts that the detention of a prisoner fol-
lowing his or her being sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction is lawful. 
However, the ECtHR has acknowledged that in some circumstances a prisoner may 
invoke the provisions of Article 5 to review his or her sentence.9 In the context of the 
review of life sentences the Court has clearly established that the fact that a person has 
been convicted does not preclude future review of his or her continued incarceration: 
in this regard the prisoner may invoke the review provisions of Article 5(4). 
Two key themes can be disinterred from the Court's j urisprudence. First, the under-
lying purpose of Article 5 is to protect individuals from being deprived of their liberty 
arbitrarily: in the context of life sentence prisoners a decision to continue their deten-
tion should not be taken arbitrarily. The required protection is achieved through the 
review mechanism prescribed by Article 5(4). Second, it may be inferred from the 
jurisprudence that prolonged detention can be justified on the limited grounds of risk 
and dangerousness. The second theme reflects the English tariff system under which a 
life sentence is in effect divided into punitive and preventive components. The thrust 
of the case law is to the effect that once the punitive element of the life sentence (as 
reflected in the tariff) has been served the continued detention of the prisoner can only 
be justified on the basis that he or she represents a continuing danger to the public, a 
matter that must be open to periodic review. Moreover, there must be a causal con-
nection between the offence for which the prisoner has been convicted and the poten-
tial for re-offending. lo Although it has not been required to rule on the matter directly, 
it is significant that the Court has indicated that public acceptability is not a relevant 
criterion on which to base a decision relating to a prisoner's release. II 
The principle that the lawfulness of a life sentence prisoner's continued detention 
must be periodically reviewed once the punitive element of the sentence has been 
served, and the corresponding entitlement to challenge that detention in accordance 
with Article 5(4), was established in the late 1980s. In Weeks v United Kingdom, 12 the 
applicant, who had been convicted of robbery, received discretionary life imprison-
ment on the grounds that he was a dangerous offender. He was subsequently released 
on licence but the licence was revoked when he committed a further offence. The 
Court accepted that the freedom of a prisoner released on licence was 'more precari-
ous' than that of a normal citizen. However, the restrictions on the applicant as an 'on 
licence' prisoner did not mean that he was not at liberty within the meaning of Article 
5. Accordingly, he was entitled to invoke that provision. Nevertheless, the Court 
concluded that the decision to re-detain the applicant in this case was neither arbitrary 
nor unreasonable since it was based on his unstable and aggressive behaviour and it 
followed that there was no violation of Article 5(1). However, the Court went on to 
hold that once he was returned to custody the applicant was entitled to the review 
specified in Article 5(4) and in the circumstances it concluded that the procedures in 
the instant case were deficient. 
European human rights law governing the determination of life sentences has 
evolved since the mid-1990s. At first the European Court drew a distinction between 
discretionary life sentences and mandatory life sentences, which coincided with the 
9 See eg Jribarne Perez v France (1996) 22 EHRR 153. 
10 vall Droogenbroeck v Belgillm (1982) 4 EHRR 443. 
11 Stafford v United Killgdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32, at para 80. 
12 (1988) 10 EHRR 293. 
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theory then underpinning English law that the latter were exclusively punitive whereas 
the former incorporated a preventative element. Hence in Wynne v United Kingdom, I 3 
the court held that a periodic review of a mandatory life sentence was not required: in 
these circumstances the review requirements of Article 5(4) were sufficiently complied 
with by both the trial court and appellate courts. The facts of this case merit con-
sideration. The applicant, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to a 
mandatory life sentence, was released on licence. Some time later he killed a woman. 
Ultimately, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsi-
bility and received a discretionary life sentence. His licence was also revoked so he 
continued to serve the life sentence for murder. Arguing that he was in reality serving 
the discretionary life sentence, the applicant contended that he was entitled to have 
that sentence reviewed. The court dismissed that claim concluding that his conviction 
for manslaughter did not alter the validity of either his original sentence for murder or 
the revocation of his licence. He continued to serve the mandatory life sentence and 
the discretionary life sentence for manslaughter merely added a supplemental basis for 
his detention. The Court reasoned that a review of the manslaughter sentence would 
be 'devoid of purpose' 14 since the applicant would continue to be held under the 
mandatory life sentence. 
In Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom,1 5 the applicants, convicted sex 
offenders, were serving discretionary life sentences but their continued post-tariff 
detention had not been periodically reviewed. They claimed that this state of affairs 
violated Article 5(4) ECHR due to the absence of a review procedure to determine the 
lawfulness of the continued detention of the prisoners after the tariff period of the sen-
tence had been served. This was not a challenge to the lawfulness of the imposition of 
the original sentence but rather against their continued indeterminate post-tariff 
detention. The ECtHR held that since the circumstances that gave rise to the appli-
cants' initial detention may have changed in the intervening time they were entitled to 
periodic reviews of their continued indeterminate detention after the punitive element 
of their respective life sentences had been served. The ECtHR explained that: 
[ ... J the factors of mental instability and dangerousness are susceptible to change over the 
passage of time and new issues of lawfulness may thus arise in the course of detention . It fol-
lows that at that phase in the execution of their sentences, the applicants were entitled under 
Article 5(4) to take proceedings to have the lawfulness of their continued detention decided 
by a court at reasonable intervals and to have the lawfulness of any re-detention determined 
by a court. 16 
The Court eventually came to realise that the distinction between mandatory and 
discretionary life sentences lacked substance. The initial change in tack occurred in 
several cases dealing with juvenile offenders who had been convicted of murder. The 
mandatory sentence for such offenders was detention during Her Majesty's 
Pleasure- in effect, they were sentenced to indefinite detention with their release being 
determined by the Home Secretary. In Hussain v United Kingdom, I 7 the applicant pris-
oner had been detained during Her Majesty's Pleasure for a murder he committed 
13 (1995) 19 EHRR 333. 
14 (1995) 19 EHRR 333, at pa ras 37- 38. 
15 (1991) 13EHRR666. 
16 (1991) 13 EHRR 666, at para 76. 
17 (1996) 22 EHRR I. 
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when he was a juvenile. The European Court held that under Article 5(4) ECHR such 
prisoners were entitled to have the lawfulness of their continued indeterminate deten-
tion considered by a court or quasi-judicial body. Subsequently, in V and T v United 
Kingdom, 18 the ECtHR in effect removed the Home Secretary's power to decide on the 
release date and, therefore, to set the tariff period of those detained at Her Majesty's 
pleasure. The ECtHR held that an 'independent and impartial tribunal', not the Home 
Secretary (an emanation of the executive), should set the tariff for juveniles convicted 
of murder. The setting of the tariff by the Home Secretary was held to be an infringe-
ment of the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Eventually, in Stafford v United Kingdom, 19 a uniform regime was adopted for manda-
tory and discretionary life sentences and for juvenile murderers. The applicant was a con-
victed murderer whose tariff period had been set by the Home Secretary in accordance 
with English domestic practice at the time. He had been released on licence but that was 
revoked on his later conviction for fraud. On completion of his fraud sentence the Parole 
Board recommended that the applicant be released but the Home Secretary rejected that 
advice on the grounds that there was a risk that the applicant would engage in further 
fraud offences. The ECtHR ruled that the applicant's rights under the provisions of 
Article 5(1) and 5(4) ECHR had been violated in that the setting of the tariff was a sen-
tencing exercise for judges, not members of the executive. The ECtHR also held that the 
Home Secretary's power of veto over a recommendation by the Parole Board to release 
a post-tariff life prisoner contravened Articles 5(1) and 5(4) ECHR. 
In Stafford, the ECtHR was particularly influenced by the fact that at this stage it had 
become widely accepted that the view that a mandatory life sentence amounts to pun-
ishment for life no longer corresponded with practical reality.20 The UK government 
had sought to maintain the distinction between mandatory and discretionary life 
sentences by arguing that, unlike the latter, the former was not based on individual char-
acteristics of dangerousness: accordingly, the argument ran, there was no issue of 
changing circumstances that might undermine the basis for continued detention. The 
Court rejected that argument, concluding that mandatory life sentences contain a puni-
tive element that is reflected in the tariff. Once that period had been served, the Court 
reasoned, the grounds for continued incarceration, 'as in discretionary life and juvenile 
murder cases must be considerations ofrisk and dangerousness'.21 Since those elements 
are liable to change over time, as in the case of other life sentence prisoners, the con-
tinued lawfulness of a prisoner's detention cannot be assumed. Departing from its 
judgment in Wynne v United Kingdom the ECtHR concluded that 'it can no longer be 
maintained that the original trial and appeal proceedings satisfied, once and for all, 
issues of compatibility of subsequent detention of mandatory life prisoners with the pro-
visions of Article 5(1) of the Convention'.22 
18 (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
19 (2002) 35 EH~R 32. 
20 In both Scotland and Northern Ireland the law had been altered to assign the function of selling the 
tariff to the trial judge: Convention Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 200 I; the Life Sentences (Northern 
Ireland) Order 200 I , S.l. 2001/2564. 
21 (2002) 35 EHRR 32, at para 80. 
22 (2002) 35 EHRR 32, at para 87. The decision in Stafford had an impact on domestic law. In 
R (Anderson) v Secretary 0/ State/or the Home Department [2003J AC I the House of Lords bowed to the 
weight of ECtHR jurisprudence and concluded that the fixing of the tariff was legally indistinguishable 
from imposing a sentence. It followed that Article 6 ECHR applied and that the tariff should be set by a 
COurt ('an independent and impartial tribunal') rather than by the Home Secretary. Accordingly, the House 
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Following the decision in Stafford it is settled that, irrespective of the form the life 
sentence takes, once the punitive element of the sentence has expired a prisoner is enti-
tled under Article 5(4) ECHR to have lawfulness of his continued indeterminate 
detention reviewed by a 'court'.23 The concept of lawfulness embraces both domestic 
and Convention law: it requires the detention to conform with domestic substantive 
and procedural rules and to be ' in keeping with the purposes of Article 5, namely to 
protect the individual from arbitrariness'.24 In the context of life sentences continued 
detention after the expiry of the punitive element has been served is justifiable only on 
grounds of risk and dangerousness. Factors that the Court has indicated that are rele-
vant in assessing whether the continued detention is lawful include mental instabil-
ity,25 unstable, disturbed and aggressive behaviour,26 youth and level of maturity27 
and personality factors such as anger, alcoholism and the ability to maintain relation-
ships.28 Given that these factors are liable to change over time a life sentence prisoner 
is entitled to frequent review of his or her sentence. 29 
It is also clear that the notion oflawful imprisonment insists that there is a sufficient 
connection between the prisoner's continued detention and the offence for which he 
or she was convicted. Thus, in Stafford v United Kingdom, 30 the Court condemned the 
imprisonment of a convicted murderer where his continued detention was based on a 
fear that he would commit fraud offences in the future. On the other hand, the circum-
stances of the original offence might be relevant to the issue of connection: in Waite v 
United Kingdom,3! the Court held that there was a sufficient connection where the 
accused, who killed his grandmother while he was addicted to glue-sniffing, had his 
licence revoked following his arrest for possession of drugs. 
Article 5(4) requires a speedy decision but it allows a measure of procedural flexi-
bility. The ECtHR has acknowledged that the review period may vary according to 
the individual circumstances of the prisoner. In Oldham v United Kingdom,32 the 
ECtHR held that an interval of two years between assessments did not fulfil the 
requirements of Article 5(4). The applicant attended a number of prescribed courses 
that were designed to deal with his anger and alcoholism problems and his difficulty 
in managing relationships. He completed these courses within eight months of his ear-
lier review and a further 16 months passed before the next review. The UK govern-
ment contended that the delay was necessary to monitor the applicant's progress but 
did not explain the nature or duration Of that process. The Court concluded that: 
of Lords declared s 29 of the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 [UK] to be incompatible with the ECHR. 
Following the decision in Anderson, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 [UK] transferred the function of setting 
the tariff, or 'minimum term ' as it is now known, to sentencing judges, a development that has the advan-
tages of being transparent and being undertaken by the official who is most familiar with the offender's 
circumstances. See D Thomas, 'The Criminal Justice Act 2003: Custodial Sentences ' [2004] Criminal Law 
Review, 702. 
23 What amounts to a 'court' is considered below in text accompanying fnn 38-42. 
24 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32, at para 63. 
2S Thynne, Wi/son and Gunnell v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 666; Stallord I' United Kingdom (2002) 
35 EHRR 32. 
26 Weeks I ' United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293. 
27 Waite v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 53236/99. 
28 Oldham\' United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 36273/97. 
29 Discussed further in text accompanying fnn 32--37 below. 
30 (2002) 35 EHRR 32. 
3 1 [2002] ECHR 53236/99. 
32 [2000] ECHR 36273/97. 
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[ ... J in the circumstances of this case that the two year delay between reviews was not rea-
sonable and that the question of whether his continued detention was lawful was not decided 
'speedily' within the meaning of Article 5(4) of the Convention. There has, accordingly, been 
a violation of this provision.33 
The ECtHR also considered the issue of frequency in Blackstock v United 
Kingdom,34 which involved a gap of 22 months between reviews. The applicant 
received a discretionary life sentence for wounding a police officer. On the expiry of 
his minimum term (ie tariff) his detention was reviewed by the Parole Board who in 
June 1998 recommended that he be transferred to an open prison or, if that recom-
mendation was not accepted by the Home Secretary, a further review in 12 months.35 
The Home Secretary rejected the recommendation and in September 1998 ruled that 
the applicant be transferred to a Category C prison. The appropriate transfer instruc-
tions were issued the following month but the applicant objected to the proposed 
prison to which he was to be sent, indicating his preference to be sent to one of several 
other named prisons. In December 1998 it was decided to transfer him to one of those 
prisons but that did not happen until April 1999 when a place became available. His 
next review took place in April 2000 with the Parole Board again recommending his 
transfer to open conditions. The Home Secretary accepted the latter recommendation. 
In ruling in favour of the applicant, the Court's starting point was that the 
frequency of reviews required by Article 5(4) ECHR must be determined in the light 
of the circumstances of each case and it refused to lay down a firm rule stipulating a 
maximum period between reviews. Instead, the Court recognised that a flexible 
approach is to be preferred since the personal circumstances of prisoners will differ 
markedly. Thus the Court had ruled in some earlier cases that gaps of between IS 
months and two years were unreasonable36 while accepting a two-year lapse in 
another case.37 In the instant case the UK government had sought to justify the delay 
on a combination of the delay (almost six months) in finding a place in the prison 
nominated by the applicant and a desire that he should spend 12 months in that facil-
ity before being considered for transfer to open conditions. The Court was not per-
suaded by that argument: no formal courses had been prescribed for the applicant 
when he was transferred and there was no evidence that, in the light of the administra-
tive delays, consideration had been given to whether it was necessary to insist on the 
usual 12 months in Category C before reviewing his case. 
The ECtHR has reflected on what constitutes a 'court' for the purposes of Article 
5(4). In Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom,38 the ECtHR ruled that a 
'court-like' body should determine the release date of life sentence prisoners. For these 
33 [2000] ECHR 36273/97, at para 37. 
34 [2005] ECHR 59512/00. 
35 At the time the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 [UK], s 28 invested the Parole Board with the power to 
order the release of discretionary life sentence prisoners once the tariff period had expired; where the Board 
chose not to order release it could make recommendations to the Home Secretary concerning the prisoner's 
future progress. 
36 Citing Herczegfalvy v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437; Oldham v United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 36273/97; 
Hirst v United Kingdom [2001) ECHR 40787/98. 
37 Citing Dancy v United Kingdom No 55768/00, 21 March 2002, where the applicant having benefited 
from previous 12-month reviews, failed to make progress and considerable offence-related work had been 
identified as being necessary. 
38 (1990) 13 EHRR 666. 
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purposes a 'court' does not have to be a permanent court in the legal system of a sig-
natory state. In Weeks v United Kingdom,39 the ECtHR explained that: 
The 'court' referred to in Article 5(4) does not necessarily have to be a court oflaw of the clas-
sic kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country .... The term 'court' 
serves to denote 'bodies which exhibit not only common fundamental features, of which the 
most important is independence of the executive and of the parties to the case ... but also the 
guarantees'-'appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question'-'of a judicial 
procedure', the forms of which may vary from one domain to another. ... In addition, as the 
text of Article 5(4) makes clear, the body in question must not have merely advisory functions 
but mllst have the competence to 'decide' the 'lawfulness' of the detention and to order 
release if the detention is unlawful. There is thus nothing to preclude a specialised body such 
as the Parole Board being considered as a 'court' within the meaning of Article 5(4), provided 
it fulfils the foregoing conditions .... 
Thus, a quasi-judicial body, such as a parole board, is a 'court' within the meaning of 
Article 5(4) ECHR provided that its deliberations are determinative rather than advi-
sory. It is also clear that the body charged with deciding on whether the life prisoner 
should be released must be independent of the executive and of the parties involved. 
In Neumeister v Austria,40 the ECtHR addressed the issue of independence of the 
Court from the procedures adopted in the following terms: 
Nor is it possible to justify application of the principle of 'equality of arms' to proceedings 
against detention on remand by invoking Article 5(4) which, while requiring that such pro-
ceedings shall be allowed, stipulates that they should be taken before a 'court'. This term 
implies only that the authority called upon to decide thereon must possess ajudicial charac-
ter, that is to say, be independent both of the executive and of the parties to the case; it in no 
way relates to the procedure to be followed. 
The central principle set out in Neumeister was amplified in de Wilde and others v 
Befgium,41 where the ECtHR insisted that the procedures adopted must be judicial in 
nature and must provide 'the individual concerned [with] guarantees appropriate to 
the kind of deprivation of liberty in question'.42 
It is essential that the body reviewing a prisoner's detention adopts procedures that 
are judicial in nature. In E v Norway,43 the ECtHR outlined the general position under 
this provision in the following terms: 
Article 5(4) does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the 
court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own 
discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide 
enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the 'lawful' detention of a person 
according to Article 5(1). 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has held that domestic judicial review proceedings do not 
satisfy Article 5(4) ECHR on the ground that that procedure is not sufficiently wide 
to determine whether the prisoner's continued imprisonment was justified by the 
39 (\988) 10 EHRR 293, at para 61. 
40 (1979) 1 EHRR91, at para 24. 
41 (1979) 1 EHRR 373. 
42 (1979) 1 EHRR 373, at para 76. 
43 (1994) 17 EHRR 30, at para 50. 
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objectives of the indeterminate sentence.44 The Court has also taken the opportunity 
to provide some procedural detail. It has held that the review proceedings must be 
adversarial45 with the prisoner being afforded an opportunity to attend an oral hear-
ing that respects the rights to be legally represented and to call and question wit-
nesses.46 The Court has also ruled that a failure to disclose adverse material that the 
review body had in its possession did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4) 
ECHR. 
The cardinal principles of ECHR law relating to the determination of life sentences 
can be summarised thus: (i) a life sentence is not per se a breach of Convention rights; 
(ii) once the punitive element of the sentence has been served a life sentence prisoner is 
entitled to a speedy and frequent review of the lawfulness of his continued detention by 
a court or quasi-judicial body; (iii) whether a review is sufficiently speedy or frequent 
is to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the particular case; (iv) the con-
cept of 'lawfulness' embraces both domestic law and ECHR considerations and the 
permitted grounds for continued detention are risk and dangerousness; (v) the review 
must be sufficiently broad to allow a determination as to whether the grounds for 
Continued detention still operate; and (vi) the body reviewing the detention must be 
invested with the power to determine the lawfulness of the prisoner's detention rather 
than acting in a merely advisory capacity and that body must be independent of the 
executive and of the parties and must adopt appropriate procedures in its hearings. 
LIFE SENTENCES IN IRELAND 
As is the case in many other jurisdictions, life sentences in Ireland fall into two 
categories. For some offences, most notably treason and murder, a mandatory life 
sentence is prescribed by law.47 It was noted above that this form of sentence is a blunt 
instrument in that it cannot reflect the culpability of the particular offender. Thus, the 
mandatory life sentence is imposed for all murders ranging from the most heinous (eg 
serial killings) to those that some might feel merit less condemnation ('mercy' killing 
of a loved one is often cited in this regard). On the other hand, it may be contended 
that the mandatory life sentence amounts to a legislative assessment of the culpability 
associated with all murders and a corresponding judgement that it is not appropriate 
to draw a distinction between different types of murder. It might further be suggested 
that a mandatory life sentence is purely punitive (and perhaps deterrent) and eschews 
other sentencing goals such as rehabilitation and incapacitation. In a word, the 
mandatory life sentence may be taken to reflect the sentiment that 'murder is murder 
is murder' and deserves the severest punishment without mitigation. However 
these considerations are not borne out in practice. Most life sentence prisoners are 
44 Weeks v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293; see also Singh v United Kingdom [1996] EHRC 
23389/94. 
45 Hussein v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR I; Singh 11 United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 23389/94. 
46 Hussein 11 United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR I; Singh v United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 23389/94; 
Stafford v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 46295/99; Waite I' United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 53236/99. 
47 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 2. Juveniles (ie persons aged under 17 years) who are convicted of murder 
might be sentenced either to a determinate term or to indefinite detention: see T O'Malley, Sentencing Law 
and Practice 2nd edn (Dublin, Thomson Round Hall , 2006) pp 394-396; also D Walsh, Juvenile Jllstice 
(Dublin, Thomson Round Hall, 2005) pp 155- 157; The People (DPP) v DG, Unreported, Court of 
Criminal Appeal, 27 May 2005. 
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eventually released and this, coupled with official or quasi-official pronouncements, 
creates an expectation that they will qualify for release.48 
The second category consists of discretionary life sentences where a maximum sen-
tence of life imprisonment is provided for by law. Discretionary life sentences are pre-
scribed for a number of serious offences including manslaughter, rape, aggravated 
sexual assault, committing a sexual act on a child less than 15 years of age, causing 
serious harm, syringe attacks, false imprisonment, robbery, aggravated burglary and 
serious drugs offences. Discretionary life sentences are more easily reconciled with the 
principle of proportionality since the particular sentence imposed can be calibrated to 
match the culpability of the offender and the circumstances of the offence.49 In such 
cases the sentencing judge enjoys the wide measure of discretion that is allowed in 
sentencing generally. 
As far as discretionary life sentences are concerned, Irish courts have indicated that 
they are governed by the principle of proportionality and it has been ruled impermis-
sible to include a preventive element in such a sentence. In theory, at least, a dis-
cretionary life sentence in Ireland is predominantly punitive in nature, designed 
exclusively to reflect the offender's culpability and the gravity of the offence. The 
dominance of the proportionality principle in the Irish sentencing process would 
appear to preclude the imposition of preventative sentences along the lines practised 
in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeal has handed down 
several decisions to the effect that a sentencing judge may not include an element of 
incapacitation, designed to protect the public from a potentially dangerous offender, 
in a sentence.50 In DPP v Jackson,5l the Central Criminal Court had imposed a dis-
cretionary life sentence on the defendant, a serious sex offender, but the Court of 
Criminal Appeal subsequently overturned that sentence on the basis that it consti-
tuted one of preventative detention. The Court clearly rejected the notion that preven-
tative detention is a feature ofIrish sentencing law, stating that: 'The Court is satisfied 
that preventative detention is not known to our judicial system and that there is no 
form of imprisonment for preventative detention'.52 The decision in Jackson was 
applied in The People (DP P) v Bambrick,53 where the Central Criminal Court refused 
to impose a sentence of preventative detention. The trial judge explained that he was: 
48 See the remarks of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 24 March 2006 (http://www. 
justice.ie/S0256EOI 003A02CF/vWeb/pcJUSQ6N7FGB-en: accessed on 15 Feb 2007): '. . nobody 
[convicted of murder] should expect even in the absence of aggravating factors and where guilt has been 
admitted, remorse shown, good behaviour demonstrated during imprisonment and a capacity for rehabili-
tation proven that there is a likelihood that he or she will be set at liberty on licence at least before the expiry 
of 12 to 14 years ... I can tell you that, of those prisoners serving life sentences who have been released over 
the past ten years, the average sentence served in prison is approximately thirteen and a half years'. See also 
Chairman's Foreword, The Parole Board, Annual Report 2005 (Dublin, 2006) p 3: 'The days of prisoners 
who have served 10 or 12 years expecting to be released from custody are now over. The sentence they must 
serve must be a long and salutary one. The Board must do everything it can to promote public confidence 
and to ensure that its attitude to the dreadful crime of murder will remain constant. The position of human 
life in society must be restored'. 
49 See further T O'Malley, Sentencing Law alld Practice 2nd edn (Dublin, Thomson Round Hall, 2006) 
pp 114-115. 
so See M Bolger, 'Judicial Discretion to Sentence Rapists to Life' (1997, April) Bar Review 249. 
51 Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 26 April 1993. 
52 Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 26 April 1993,per Hederman J. 
S3 [1996]1 IR 265. 
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[ . .. J precluded from approaching the case on the basis that over and above any considera-
tions of punishment this dangerous accused should be preventively detained until in the 
opinion of the most qualified experts he is safe to be let back into the community.54 
In view of this general policy, the sentencing process should not be concerned with the 
potential for future re-offending. 55 Probably as a result of this stance very few prison-
ers are sentenced to discretionary life sentences: the vast bulk of life sentence prisoners 
in the Irish prison system are serving mandatory sentences. Prisoners convicted of 
treason and certain forms of murder are required to serve a minimum of 40 years 
before becoming eligible for release. 56 In the case of other life sentence prisoners 
Ireland, unlike the United Kingdom, has not adopted a formal practice of setting tar-
iffs or minimum terms to be served. Significantly, sentencing judges do not express an 
opinion on the length of time that should be served by life sentence prisoners although 
on occasion some judges have obliquely indicated their views on the matter without 
specifying a particular number of years. On the other hand, both the Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Parole Board have proclaimed that a life 
sentence prisoner will not be considered for release until he or she has served at least 14 
years. 57 By their very nature these pronouncements are political, stemming from a con-
cern to be seen not to be overly lenient towards murderers, and do not bind the 
Minister. With the exceptions noted above, there is no legal impediment to releasing a 
life sentence prisoner early nor is there an entitlement to be considered for release after 
a certain period. 
REVIEW OF SENTENCES IN IRISH LA W 
A range of constitutional and statutory provisions governs the review of sentences in 
Ireland. In particular, the law accommodates the commutation and remission of pun-
ishment on the one hand, and the temporary release of prisoners on the other. Each is 
governed by separate legal provisions.58 Article 13.6 of the Irish Constitution provides 
for the pardoning of offenders and the commutation and remission of punishment: 
The right of pardon and the power to commute or remit punishment imposed by any court 
exercising criminal jurisdiction are hereby vested in the President, but such power of commu-
tation or remission may also be conferred by law on other authorities. 
The Criminal Procedure Act 1993 prescribes the procedure to be followed by a 
person who seeks a presidential pardon. The power of pardon cannot be delegated but 
it is clear that the powers of commutation and remission are delegable. Section 23(1) 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 duly conferred the 'power to commute or remit 
punishment' on the executive. 59 Section 23A of the 1951 Act, inserted by section 17 of 
54 [1996]1 IR 265 at 276-277. 
55 However, preventative considerations may feature in the decision to allow a prisoner temporary 
release; see further in text accompanying fn 71. 
56 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 4. 
57 See remarks quoted in fn 48. 
58 See further on commutation and remission of sentences G Hogan and G Whyte (eds) J. M Kelly: The 
Irish ConslilUlion 4th edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) paras 4. 1.384. 1.50. 
. 59 Section 23(1) of the J 951 Act inter alia reads: '[t]he Government may commute or remit, in whole or 
In part, any punishment imposed by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, subject to such conditions as 
they may think proper'. 
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the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1997, allows the government to 
delegate its powers of remission to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. 
The courts have considered the nature of the power of remission. In The Stale (0) 
v O'Brien,60 6 Dalaigh CJ drew a distinction between an act of sentencing and one 
that merely effects a remission. 6J Walsh J, drawing the same distinction, spoke of the 
judicial character of the power of remission: 
The power of commutation and remission ... is a power which, although a power of a 
judicial character, is nonetheless expressly conferred by the provisions of the Constitution 
upon the President and, in certain instances, upon the Executive or members thereof. It was, 
of course, quite open to the People when enacting the Constitution to confer powers of ajudi-
cial character upon the Executive or to provide by the Constitution means whereby it could 
be done by Act of the Oireachtas; but that does not alter the nature of the power.62 
In a dissenting judgment, McLoughlin J expressed a different view. He saw the 
power of commutation and remission as corresponding to the royal prerogative of 
mercy and, therefore, as being executive in nature. In Brennan v Minister for Justice,63 
Geoghegan J also preferred the view that the power of remission is executive in nature. 
However, he went on to state that that power should be exercised sparingly and, given 
the special nature of the power, the evidence supporting a decision to remit and the 
reasons for it should be recorded. Moreover, he ventured the opinion that the exercise 
of the power of remission is open to judicial review. 
The constitutionally located powers of commutation and remission are comple-
mented by the statutory power to order the temporary release of prisoners: in practice, 
it is the latter power that is employed to bring about the release of life sentence 
prisoners. A comprehensive statutory regime governing the temporary release was 
adopted in 2003 when section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1960 was amended by sec-
tion I of the Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of Prisoners) Act 2003: 
The Minister may direct that such person as is specified in the direction (being a person who 
is serving a sentence of imprisonment) shall be released from prison for such temporary 
period, and subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the direction or rules under this 
section [ .. .). 
This provision establishes a clear legislative basis for the power of the Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform to grant temporary release of prisoners by setting 
down the principles that will apply to its exercise. 64 The Act stipulates the purposes for 
which temporary release may be ordered: to assess the prisoner's ability to be re-
integrated into society, to prepare him or her for release on the expiry of his or her 
sentence or to assist the police in investigating crime;65 where release is warranted on 
health or humanitarian grounds;66 on the grounds of good prison management;67 and 
where the Minister is of the opinion that the prisoner has been rehabilitated and is 
ready for re-integration into society.68 
60 [I973]lR 50. 
6 1 [I973JIR 50 at 60. 
62 [1973] IR 50 at 70. 
63 [1995]1 IR 6[2. 
64 Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of Prisoners) Bill 2001. explanatory memorandum. 
65 Criminal Justice Act 1960, s 2(l)(a). 
66 Criminal Justice Act 1960, s 2(1)(b). 
67 Criminal Justice Act 1960, s 2(1)(c). 
68 Criminal Justice Act 1960, s 2(l)(d). 
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Section 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1960 outlines the range of factors that the 
Minister is required to take into account in reaching a decision on temporary release: 
(a) the nature and gravity of the offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served 
by the person relates, 
(b) the sentence of imprisonment concerned and any recommendations of the court that 
imposed that sentence in relation thereto, 
(c) the period of the sentence of imprisonment served by the person, 
(d) the potential threat to the safety and security of members of the public (including the vic-
tim of the offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served by the person 
relates) should the person be released from prison, 
(e) any offence of which the person was convicted before being convicted of the offence to 
which the sentence of imprisonment being served by him relates, 
(f) the risk of the person failing to return to prison upon the expiration of any period of tem-
porary release, 
(g) the conduct of the person while in custody, while previously the subject of a direction 
under this section, or during a period of temporary release to which rules under this sec-
tion, made before the coming into operation of the Criminal Justice (Tel11porary Release 
of Prisoners) Act 2003, applied, 
(11) any report of, or recommendation made by-
(i) the governor of, or person for the time being performing the functions of governor 
in relation to, the prison concerned, 
(ii) the Garda Sioch!lOa, 
(iii) a probation and welfare officer, or 
(iv) any other person whom the Minister considers would be of assistance in enabling 
him to make a decision as to whether to give a direction under subsection (I) that 
relates to the person concerned. 
(i) the risk of the person committing an offence during any S.l period of temporary release, 
(j) the risk of the person failing to comply with any conditions attaching to his temporary 
release, and 
(k) the likelihood that any period of temporary release might accelerate the person's reinte-
gration into society or improve his prospects of obtaining employment.' 
The Minister is prevented from ordering temporary release if he or she is of the opin-
ion that it would not be appropriate to do so for reasons connected with any of the 
foregOing factors or if the prisoner has been remanded in custody by a court.69 
Moreover, section 2(3)(b) stipulates that a prisoner may not be released if another 
statute prohibits such release, a provision that is relevant in the case of those serving 
sentences for treason, certain forms of murder and some drug dealing offences.7o 
The power to order temporary release applies to life sentence prisoners and those 
serving a fixed term alike. It is noteworthy that both punitive and preventative con-
Siderations feature in the decision to allow temporary release. In particular, the factors 
listed in section 2(2)(a), (b) and (c) relate to the offender's culpability while the 
provision in paragraph (d) is clearly preventative in nature. Therefore, despite the 
COurts' determination to avoid sentencing on a preventative basis71 the Minister for 
69 Criminal Justice ACl1960, s 2(3)(a) and (c). 
:0 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 4 (prescribing a 40 year minimum term for treason and certain murders); 
Misuse of Drugs 1977, s 15A (specifying minimum terms for possession for supply of drugs worth more than 
€13,000). 
7, See text accompanying fnn 50-54. 
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Justice, Equality and Law Reform is statutorily obliged to take preventative consider-
ations into account when deciding on the question of temporary release. As far as life 
sentence prisoners are concerned the net effect of this state of affairs is that the 
determination of their sentence is, in part, shaped by preventative concerns. To this 
extent, the fate of the life sentence prisoner in Ireland differs little from his or her 
English counterpart, despite the formal differences in sentence structure between the 
two jurisdictions. 
The power to grant temporary release has been distinguished from the power to 
commute or remit punishment. In Kinahan v The Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, the Supreme Court, per Hardiman J, stated:72 
It does not appear ... that temporary release is a specific exercise of the general power of 
commutation or remission envisaged in the Constitution. Rather, it appears to be a statutory 
creation administered under the Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1960, which instru-
ment was in turn made under the powers conferred by the Criminal Justice Act, 1960. 
An administrative framework has been put in place to manage the temporary release 
of prisoners, including life sentences. The Parole Board, which was established in 2001 
replacing the former Sentence Review Group, considers cases for release and advises 
the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Significantly, the Parole Board 
was established on a temporary non-statutory basis and it lacks the power to deter-
mine cases: its role is merely advisory and the Minister is not obliged to act on their 
advice. Despite its non-statutory basis it is likely that the manner in which the Parole 
Board conducts hearings is open to judicial review: its predecessor, the Sentence 
Review Group has been successfully challenged in judicial review proceedings.73 
However, the susceptibility of the Parole Board to judicial review to ensure compli-
ances with the principles of fair procedures is not matched by a similar judicial will-
ingness to scrutinise the actual exercise of the power to allow temporary release. 
The Irish courts have been consistent in their reluctance to engage in the review of 
sentences. Inspired by separation of powers considerations they have indicated that the 
question of early release is an executive matter and that the courts should exercise cau-
tion in encroaching on that territory. The executive enjoys a wide measure of discretion 
in the matter of release, which is seen as a privilege that is extended to prisoners rather 
than a right.74 Judicial review of a refusal to order temporary release will be successful 
only on the limited grounds that the refusal was arbitrary, capricious or unjust. 75 
In The People (DPP) v Tiernan,76 it was held that a court should not take account 
of the possible release of an offender when determining the appropriate sentence to 
impose. Finlay CJ emphasised the discretionary nature of temporary release: 
72 [2001]4 IR 454 at 457. 
7J Barry v Sentence Review Group [2001]4 IR 167. 
74 See Ryan II Governor of Limerick Prison [1988) IR 198 at 200. per Murphy J: ' ... temporary release is 
a privilege or concession to which the person in custody has no right .. .'; Dowling v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform [2003) 2 JR 535 at 538, per Murray J: ' ... temporary release of a prisoner 
before the sentence imposed by the court has expired is a privilege accorded to him at the discretion of the 
execu tive'. 
75 This broadly corresponds with the grounds on which the courts will overturn an administrative deci-
sion: see The State (Keegan) II Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642; O'Keeffe v An Bard 
Pleanala [1993] 1 IR 39; see further G Hogan and D G Morgan, Administrative Law in Ireland 3rd edn 
(Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) pp 641 649. 
76 [1988] IR 250 at 256. 
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What is described in this ground as the conventional period a person who has been sentenced 
to life imprisonment might expect to serve is a matter of a policy pursued by the Executive at 
given times and subject to variation at the discretion of the Executive. It cannot, therefore, in 
my view, properly be taken into consideration by a court in imposing sentence. 
In Murray v Jreland,77 the Supreme Court refused to direct the executive to grant 
temporary release to the plaintiffs, a married couple serving life sentences for murder. 
Finlay CJ explicitly invoked separation of powers considerations: 
[ ... J it was said that a court should direct the executive to grant temporary release for this 
purpose .... The length of time which a person sentenced to imprisonment for life spends in 
custody and as a necessary consequence the extent to which, if any, prior to final discharge, 
such a person obtains temporary release is a matter which under the constitutional doctrine 
of the separation of powers rests entirely with the executive [ ... ].78 
However, the Court did concede that there is scope for a limited form of judicial 
scrutiny of the executive role. Finlay CJ explained: 79 
The exercise of these powers of the executive is of course subject to supervision by the courts 
which will intervene only if it can be established that they are being exercised in a manner 
which is in breach of the constitutional obligation of the executive not to exercise them in a 
capricious, arbitrary or unjust way. It is not, however, in my view, permissible for the court 
to intervene merely on the grounds that it would [ ... J have reached a different conclusion on 
the appropriateness [ ... J of temporary release. 
The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated these views. In McHugh v Minister for 
Justice,80 the Court stressed that temporary release and any form of release under 
escort are exclusively matters within the Minister's discretion. In Kinahan v Minister 
for Justice and Law Reform,s, the Court took the view that the same legal position 
governs the release of life sentence prisoners and those serving determinate sentences. 
Referring to the decision in Murray, Hardiman J stated: 
In my view, this decision properly emphasises the importance of the constitutional separation 
of powers in dealing with the implementation by the executive of a judicially imposed sen-
tence of imprisonment. It also correctly identifies the sole circumstances in which the court 
would be justified in interfering with a decision in relation to temporary release. 82 
As to the exercise of the executive discretion in the matter, the Court rejected the 
notion that there is a presumption that a prisoner is entitled to temporary release. 83 
The Criminal Justice (Release of Prisoners) Act 1998 was enacted in the aftermath 
to the 'Good Friday Agreement' to provide a mechanism for the early release of pris-
oners. The Supreme Court, again emphasising the discretionary nature of the power 
to release, has held that the Act did not create a right to be released. In O'Neill v 
Governor of Castlerea Prison,84 Keane CJ spoke for the Court: 
77 [1991]2 ILRM 465. 
78 [1991]2 ILRM 465 at 472. 
79 [1991]2 ILRM 465 at 473. 
80 [1997]1 IR 245. 
81 [2001]4 IR 454. 
82 [2001]4IR454at459. 
83 The Court also dismissed the argument that the recommendations of the Council of Europe of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on European Prison Rules were binding. 
84 [2004]1 IR 298 at 314; see also Doherty v Govemor of Port/aoise Prison [2002]2 IR 252. 
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The power to release itself, whether exercised on what might be called conventional grounds 
of a compassionate or humanitarian nature or for purely political considerations, as in the 
case of releases effected for the purpose of giving effect to the Belfast Agreement, is a quin-
tessentially executive function. 
The broad nature of the discretion to grant temporary release was central to the 
decision of the High Court in Breathnach v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform,85 where the applicant was granted temporary release on condition that he 
remained handcuffed during his release. He challenged that condition as being unrea-
sonable and argued that since the respondent had not presented material to the court 
to show why handcuffing was necessary the court should conclude that there was no 
basis to support that condition. Rejecting the claim, 6 Caoimh J concluded that it was 
within the respondent's discretion 'to release the applicant subject to any conditions 
which he chose to impose'.86 The Court also took the view that in the circumstances it 
was not necessary to give reasons for the imposition of the condition. 
The revocation of temporary release where a prisoner had been charged with, but 
not convicted of, another offence was condemned by the Supreme Court in The State 
(Murphy) v Kieft. 87 While the Court acknowledged that the executive enjoyed a wide 
measure of discretion in the matter it ruled that in the circumstances the applicant 
should have been afforded the opportunity to refute the allegation. Griffin J 
explained: 
[ ... ) the fact that the [applicant) had been charged with an offence is an insufficient reason 
for the revocation of his temporary release. Charges are frequently dropped or not proceeded 
with and, if temporary release can be revoked merely or solely because the person released 
has been charged with an offence, what of the apparent injustice done to such a person who, 
in the period intervening between the charge and the dropping of the chargcs, has lost the lib-
erty to which he would otherwise have been entitled [ ... ].88 
It would appear that one response to the decision in The State (Murphy) v Kieft was 
to allow shorter periods of temporary release which could be renewed each time the 
previous period expired. The strategy was considered in Dowling v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform.89 The applicant in the latter case was a life sentence 
prisoner who had been granted temporary release on a monthly renewable basis: he 
was required to sign on at Mountjoy Prison on the 23rd day of each month. On 23 
Decem ber 1999 the applicant was arrested and questioned in relation to a murder and, 
although he was released from police custody without charge, he was returned to 
prison the same day. The High Court refused to quash the revocation on the grounds 
that temporary release was a concession to which the prisoner had no right. The 
Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the revocation. The Court again 
emphasised that temporary release is a privilege and that the executive enjoys a wide 
discretion in the matter. Moreover, Murray J, in language remarkably similar to that 
used by the ECtHR on the matter,90 commented on the conditional nature of the 
85 [2004] 3 IR 336. 
86 [2004] 3 IR 336 at 343. 
87 [1984] IR 458. 
88 [1984] IR 458 al473. 
89 [2003] 2 IR 535. 
90 Weeks II United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293. 
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liberty of a prisoner on temporary release: it is not 'on a par'9! with that of the ordin-
ary citizen. 
The decision in Dowling turned on an interpretation of the nature of the release 
granted to the applicant. Was it, as the respondent contended, a series of separate one-
month releases with a new one-month period of release being allowed each time? If 
that was the position it was clear that the executive could not be compelled to grant a 
fresh period of temporary release on the expiry of any particular period of release. 
However, the Court reached the different conclusion that in reality the applicant had 
been granted indefinite temporary release, not a series of separate monthly releases, 
which was revoked when he was returned to Mountjoy Prison: hence the relevance to 
this case of the decision in The State (Murphy) 11 Kieft. 
Some judges adopted the practice of incorporating a review element into the sen-
tence. Thus, an offender might have been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, to 
be reviewed after 36 months with a view to determining whether the remainder of the 
sentence could be suspended. One purpose served by such a sentencing structure is 
that it allows the court to take account of the offender's progress in prison and if it is 
satisfactory to give him or her the benefit of that progress. However, there is also a sus-
picion that a sentence of this type has the darker attraction of preventing the executive 
from releasing the prisoner prior to the review date and that it was a judicial attempt 
to counteract the 'revolving door' phenomenon. The superior courts have condemned 
this sentencing practice on the grounds, inter alia, that such sentences seek to 'freeze' 
the exercise of executive discretion. 92 
The Supreme Court definitively resolved the matter in The People (DPP) v Finn,93 
where it rejected the idea that the sentencing judge could include a review date for pos-
sible release on licence. Keane CJ explained that: 
The making of such orders is not merely inconsistent with the provisions of s. 23 of the Act 
of 1951 : it offends the separation of powers in this area mandated by Article 13.6 of the 
Constitution. That provision expressly vests the power of commutation or remission in the 
President but provides that the power may also be conferred by law on other authorities. 
Since under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution the sole and exclusive power of making laws 
for the State is vested in the Oireachtas, it was for the legislative arm alone to determine which 
authorities other than the President should exercise that power. In enacting s. 23 of the 
Criminal Justice Act, 1951 , the Oireachtas conferred the power of commutation or remission 
on the government or, where it delegated its power, the Minister for Justice .... It would seem 
to follow that the remission power, despite its essentially judicial character, once vested under 
the Constitution in an executive organ, cannot, without further legislative intervention, be 
exercised by the courts.94 
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice offered the opinion that: 
It is also, of course, open to the Oireachtas to provide by legislation, as has been done in other 
countries, for the regular review of sentences by a parole board and such an approach might 
91 [2003] 21R 535 at 538 . 
. 92 The People v Cahill [1980] IR 8; O'Brien v Governor oj Limerick Prison [197]21LRM 349. A different 
~lew was expressed by Walsh J in The People (DPP) I ' Alymer [1995] 2 ILRM 624. See T O'Malley, 
Pnnciples of Sentencing: Some recent Developments' (2001) 1(1) Judicial Studies Instill/te Journal 50 at 
56--63. 
93 [200 1]21R 25. See M O'Connell, 'The Supreme Court Decision in DPP v Padraig Finn' (2001, April) 
Bar RevielV 354. 
94 [200 I] 2 JR 25 at 46. 
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well be consistent with modern penological principles. These again, however, are entirely 
matters for the legislature and not within the competence of the courts, having regard to 
Article 13.6, to determine.95 
This passage provides the Oireachtas with the reassurance that it is constitutionally per-
missible to enact legislation establishing a system of sentence review by an independent 
statutory body. It may be inferred that the Court was fully aware of the demands of sen-
tence management and the desirability of providing a mechanism for the determination 
of life sentences: hence the reference to 'modern penological principles'. 
CONCLUSION 
The European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence concerning the determination 
oflife sentences is particularly relevant since the enactment in Ireland of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. Rulings by the Court on the temporary 
release or release on licence of life sentence prisoners strongly indicate that current 
Irish law is not compatible with the ECHR. 
The most significant deficiency in Irish law is that release is treated as an executive 
matter, a position that is in marked contrast to the position in European human rights 
law. Article 5(4) ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, demands that a court or 
'court-like' body should be entrusted with the release of life sentence prisoners. The 
key features of such a body is that it is independent of the executive and of the parties, 
that it has the power to determine cases, that it conducts adversarial hearings and 
accords to the prisoner the procedural rights that follow from such a hearing. The cur-
rent Parole Board fails to satisfy ECHR requirements. The difficulty is that the Parole 
Board lacks the power to determine cases, its role being merely advisory. Moreover, 
the limited form of judicial scrutiny that Irish law allows does not meet the demands 
of the Convention. The ECtHR decisions have firmly indicated that judicial review 
proceedings do not provide the form of review required: 96 a mechanism that allows 
the review body to consider the factual basis for the continued detention of the life 
sentence prisoner is necessary. 
The chasm between the Irish position and that required by the ECHR causes appre-
ciable difficulties for Irish law given the Irish courts' reliance on the concept of sep-
aration of powers as underpinning their reluctance to engage in sentence review. There 
is a strange irony to the latter consideration given that the European Court and the 
House of Lords, in Stafford97 and Anderson98 respectively, have invoked the separa-
tion of powers in support of a very different conclusion: the view expressed in those 
cases is that the separation of powers demanded that sentencing and the setting of the 
tariff remain matters for the judiciary, not the executive. It is not beyond the bounds 
of possibility that the Irish courts will revise their position and bring Irish law into 
conformity with the ECHR. It is open to the courts to breathe life into the European 
Convention of Human Rights Act 2003 by interpreting it in a sufficiently expansive 
95 [2001]2 IR 2S at 46. 
96 Weeks v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293; see also Singh v United Kingdom [1996) ECHR 
23389/94. 
97 (2002) 35 EHRR 32. 
98 [2003) AC 1. See M Amos, 'R v Secretary 0/ Slate/or the Home Department, ex p Anderson Ending the 
Home Secretary's Sentencing Role' (2004) 67 Model'll Law Review 108. 
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manner to ensure the reception of the relevant ECHR standards in domestic law: sec-
tion 4 of the Act requires the courts to take 'due account' of the principles of European 
human rights law. To this end it is possible that the Irish courts, much like their 
English counterparts, will be driven to declaring the current legal position prescribed 
by section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 196099 incompatible with the ECHR. This, of 
course, is a matter of speculation and it must be acknowledged that, to date, European 
human rights law has had a marginal in1pact on domestic Irish law and a decision 
along the lines of that in Anderson would represent a significant change in judicial atti-
tude. However, it must also be observed that Irish case law on sentence review focused 
exclusively on questions of domestic law and that the ECHR issues were not raised in 
or considered by the courts. From a strictly doctrinal perspective the question whether 
Irish law can be interpreted in a manner that conforms to the ECHR, and the related 
question whether the courts would issue a declaration of incompatibility if the first 
question is answered in the negative, remain undecided. 
It goes without saying that curing the defects in Irish law by judicial means requires 
an aggrieved litigant to initiate legal proceedings, an exhaustive process that leaves the 
law unchanged in the interim. Irish law might be aligned with the ECHR by a more 
direct legislative route. There is no constitutional impediment to transferring the 
power of release from the executive to a body that matches ECHR demands. As it 
happens the judgment in The People (DP P) v Finn, 100 quoted above, has opened the 
door to a development of the type required by ECtHRjurisprudence. The simple solu-
tion is to enact legislation that places the Parole Board on a statutory footing and 
assign to it the function of regularly reviewing sentences. In this way the Parole Board 
would acquire the vital qualities of a 'court like' body, namely that it is independent 
of the executive and acts impartially. It is clearly within the competence of the 
Oireachtas to enact such legislation. Whether it does so without prior judicial inter-
vention remains to be seen. 
99 See text accompanying fnn 64-71. 
100 [2001]2 IR 25. 
